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Fusing Drug Enforcement:  
A Study of the El Paso Intelligence Center 
 
DAMIEN VAN PUYVELDE 
 
ABSTRACT  This article examines the evolution of the El Paso Intelligence 
Center (EPIC), a key intelligence component of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, to shed light on fusion efforts in drug enforcement. Since 1974, 
EPIC has strived to fuse the resources and capabilities of multiple government 
agencies to counter drug trafficking and related threats along the Southwest US 
border. While undergoing a steady growth, the Center has confronted a host of 
challenges that illuminate the uses and limits of multi-agency endeavors in drug 
enforcement. An evaluative study of the Center shows that it is well aligned with 
the federal government priorities in the realm of drug enforcement; however the 
extent to which the Center’s activities support the government’s efforts in this 
domain is not so clear. The Center needs to improve the way it reviews its own 
performance to better adapt and serve its customers. 
 
Fusion centers: more than a trend 
 
In the last decade, there has been much public discussion about the role fusion centers 
can play in support of national security efforts.
1
 This emphasis is related to the 9/11 
attacks and the subsequent advent of the global war on terrorism. Following these attacks, 
number of experts highlighted the failure of key US intelligence agencies, namely the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to 
share intelligence in their effort to maintain national security.
2
 Acknowledging this 
shortcoming, the federal government launched a series of initiatives, including the 
establishment of a new “information sharing environment” under the auspices of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the creation by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of a nationwide system of 78 fusion centers 
 2 
supposed to enable information and intelligence sharing between local, tribal, state, and 
federal agencies.
3
 
Fusion centers have been one of the key instruments used by the US government 
to adopt a more networked approach to national security.
4
 The coordination they foster is 
believed to be essential to tackle the threats posed by transnational criminal and terrorist 
organizations, which seek to benefit from the jurisdictions and boundaries that limit 
government authorities.
5
 Fusion centers bring together representatives from a variety of 
agencies together and act as “a mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, 
maximize resources, streamline operations and improve the ability” to “detect, prevent, 
investigate and respond to” security threats.6 Over the long term, their establishment is 
expected to have a cultural effect, instilling a common ethos among participating 
members. Given the important role entrusted to fusion centers and the significant public 
resources invested in them, assessing their ability to achieve these short and long term 
goals is an important task.
7
 
Recent academic discussions on intelligence fusion have often focused on 
counterterrorism.
8
 Considering the US government’s efforts to better integrate 
counterterrorism since the 9/11 attacks, this is understandable. However, the fusion of 
resources and capabilities has long been used, formally and informally, to support a host 
of security efforts in the United States and elsewhere.
9
 In the United States, the roots of 
modern fusion centers can be traced to the law enforcement community where fusion has 
long been used as a part of temporary task forces and more permanent intelligence 
centers.
10
 This article seeks to fill a gap in the literature about the role of multi-agency 
efforts in the context of drug enforcement, by examining the evolution of the El Paso 
Intelligence Center (EPIC), one of the main intelligence components of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), and evaluating its performance.
11
 
EPIC was established in 1974 and, according to the DEA, it was “the first major 
attempt at a permanent interagency operation in law enforcement.” 12  By fusing the 
resources and expertise of its members, analyzing data and disseminating crime 
intelligence to law enforcement officers,
13
 EPIC aims to offer the strategic, operational 
and tactical resources necessary to strengthen the government’s effort to interdict 
narcotics and weapons trafficking, as well as alien smuggling, along the Southwest 
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border. A DHS official goes as far as to credit EPIC as an inspiration behind the 
multiplication of fusion centers in the early twenty-first century.
14
 If the origins of fusion 
in the US lie in drug enforcement, EPIC is a particularly relevant case to study, not only 
because of its 40 years history, but also because of its location at the heart of the 
government’s counternarcotic efforts.15  
An overview of the evolving scope of activities of the Center provides the context 
for considering EPIC’s performance. The limited literature on EPIC has mostly been 
written in professional magazines by staff, and unsurprisingly tends to emphasize EPIC’s 
tactical successes, or its ability to turn “raw data into actionable intelligence” leading to 
arrests and drug seizures.
16
 Much of this literature uses specific examples to present the 
Center as a successful organization able to coordinate the intelligence collection and 
analytical capabilities of a variety of government agencies to locate and apprehend 
criminals.
17
 These success stories are informative but they do not provide a systematic 
assessment of EPIC’s activities based on the Center’s mission. 
To assess the performance of the El Paso Intelligence Center, this article focuses 
on three main components – processes, enablers and outcomes – and examines the extent 
to which they are aligned with EPIC’s main goal: supporting drug enforcement efforts 
along the Southwest border.
18
 The core processes implemented at EPIC broadly follow 
the intelligence cycle and include tasking, collection, analysis and production, and 
dissemination and feedback. The article examines how EPIC approaches each of these 
steps and identifies related shortfalls, including a lengthy intelligence production process, 
and the limited gathering of feedback from its customers. A number of resources and 
capabilities make EPIC’s core processes possible and, in the best cases, effective. These 
enablers include governance, information communication technology, and human 
resources.
19
 Each of these enablers poses recurring challenges that require continued 
attention by the Center’s leadership. Progress in the domain of human resources, in 
particular, including the systematic gathering of feedback from EPIC’s own staff and the 
provision of common training programs, could reinforce the interagency ethos of the 
Center and suggest ways to produce intelligence in a more timely manner.  
The Center’s activities serve a series of outcomes that are aligned with some of 
the federal government’s strategic goals in the realm of drug enforcement. The 
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achievement of these outcomes is typically measured thanks to a series of outputs, or 
concrete services and products offered by EPIC to support law enforcement efforts.
20
 
However, the Center’s performance reviews have been limited by the absence of 
systematic mechanism to gather feedback from its customers and employees. Recent 
progress in this area is notable, but it will need to be followed upon by a methodical 
effort to gather and exploit feedback. This will pave the way for more comprehensive and 
continuous assessments of EPIC’s ability to support drug enforcement, and should in turn 
allow the Center to adapt and better serve its customers. 
  
The Origins of EPIC 
 
In the early 1970s much of the focus of the federal government was directed towards a 
global war on the manufacture, distribution and use of narcotics.
21
 Congress passed the 
Controlled Substances Act in 1970, and three years later President Richard Nixon signed 
a presidential reorganization plan that merged pre-existing organizations – the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and the 
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI) – into a single agency, the DEA.22 This 
consolidation of drug law enforcement sought to provide momentum in the war on drugs, 
coordinate the government’s drug enforcement efforts across local, state, national and 
international levels, and make drug enforcement more accountable.
23
 
The newly-created DEA established its Office of Intelligence on July 1, 1973, 
thus affirming the importance of intelligence in the fight against criminal networks. From 
its onset, DEA intelligence was marked by the law enforcement culture. DEA’s job is to 
put criminals in jail, and as a result, the intelligence it develops is primarily investigative 
and tactical. When information is gathered, it is expected to lead to arrests and seizures. 
DEA intelligence has traditionally been produced to serve two main types of consumers: 
senior decision-makers like the DEA administrator and other federal, state and local 
agencies.
24
 As a result, the agency’s intelligence capability was initially divided into an 
Office of Intelligence located at the headquarters and regional intelligence units. At the 
regional and local levels, the use of multi-agency task forces allowed law enforcement 
officers to overcome cross-jurisdictional challenges and strengthen DEA’s enforcement 
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missions. At the federal level, DEA intelligence informed the strategies and plans 
developed by senior decision-makers. 
The Unified Intelligence Division, established in 1973, was the first DEA field 
intelligence unit based on the concept of task force. This division brought together DEA 
special agents, DEA intelligence analysts, New York State Police investigators and New 
York City detectives who systematically engaged all aspects of the intelligence process in 
the context of law enforcement intelligence.
25
 That same year the DEA launched its first 
federal law enforcement automated index, a record management system called the 
National Narcotics Intelligence System. Some of the defining features of law 
enforcement intelligence appear very clearly in this early history of DEA intelligence, 
including the importance given to supporting intelligence consumers at various levels of 
government, and the use of databases and task forces to support decisions at the tactical 
level. 
The border between the United States and Mexico was and remains a long-
standing challenge for the US government and its law enforcement community. 
Boundaries create jurisdictional limits, which criminals seek to use to their advantage. 
Illicit drugs, undocumented aliens and contrabands, as well as cash and weapons have 
been smuggled across the Southwest border for decades, and it is somewhat naturally that 
the federal government paid particular attention to this region as a part of its more general 
reform of drug enforcement in the 1970s.
26
 Border intelligence has traditionally been 
composed of several systems directed towards specific enforcement targets. A Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs report found in 1973 that the DEA, the Customs 
Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Aviation Authority 
(FAA), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS) and the Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs itself were all collecting raw intelligence on drug, the smuggling of 
weapons and aliens along the Southwest border, but were not coordinating and analyzing 
trends in any systematic way.
27
  
Taking act of this situation, a Department of Justice (DOJ) report recommended 
establishing a Southwest Border Intelligence Service Center to “provide for the most 
effective sharing of intelligence developed by border enforcement agencies.”28 The center 
would: 
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consolidate, analyze, and disseminate on request all-source data regarding 
border related violations; identify conspirators and the scope and method 
of their activities; assess and evaluate border conspiracy operations; and 
develop and maintain coordination with the Southwest border enforcement 
agencies so that a prompt response can be mounted for “hot” intelligence 
items developed by one agency that fall under the responsibility of 
another.
29
  
 
The DOJ further recommended the DEA be in charge of the center, which would be 
staffed jointly by representatives of the DEA, I&NS and Customs. Considering the 
broader role of intelligence in law enforcement, the report imagined a center that would 
primarily support field agents on a 24-hour basis, “facilitate information exchange 
between Washington and the field,” and host “data terminals capable of accessing 
participating agency data bases.”30  
These recommendations were acted upon and the DOJ established the El Paso 
Intelligence Center in 1974. The city of El Paso, TX, located at the midpoint of the US-
Mexican border, and bordering the state of New Mexico, appeared as a logical place to 
set up a center aiming to facilitate drug enforcement coordination at the local, state, 
federal and international levels.
31
 The Center quickly expanded to form a “prototype” of 
national narcotics intelligence system serving “federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies with data from various sources.”32 EPIC effectively acted as a clearinghouse for 
drug related information, in particular information about drug movement in land, air, sea, 
alien smuggling, and weapons trafficking. This information was stored in manual 
databases and used to support interdiction efforts.
33
 For example, EPIC stored 
information received from DEA pilots who identified suspect vessels in Colombia thanks 
to reconnaissance flights, crosschecked the information and relayed it to the US Coast 
Guards who were able to stop these vessels.
34
 
 
A Steady Growth 
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From its initial focus on the Southwest border, EPIC’s scope has grown to include 
worldwide drug smuggling and other criminal activities with a particular concentration 
on the Western hemisphere.
35
 One rationale behind this expansion is that nearly all the 
contraband and criminal activities along the Southwest border have substantial 
connections to locations that are more remote. The scope of activities of the DEA and 
EPIC further expanded as a result of the increasing globalization of drug trafficking in the 
last decades.
36
  
EPIC’s functions and capabilities have expanded in parallel. Seventeen employees 
initially staffed the Center in 1974. This workforce grew up to 100 employees in the 
1980s, 300 in the 1990s, and over 400 today.
37
 The number of agencies contributing to 
the Center also multiplied from three federal agencies to 28 federal, state, and local 
agencies, and four foreign liaison officers from the Mexican military, justice and police, 
and the Colombian national police.
38
 Today, the Center has agreements to share 
information and intelligence with all 50 US states, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands 
and the District of Columbia. Memoranda of understanding have been signed with 
Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands and law enforcement agencies in these countries 
are, in principle, able to consume and share information with EPIC. In practice, 
international cooperation remains limited, and foreign partners are generally not granted 
direct access to the databases and finished intelligence products available to EPIC’s 
American customers.
39
 
The demand for EPIC’s products and services has grown over the years. From a 
few hundreds of customers in the mid-1970s, EPIC reported more than 19,000 approved 
users in 2009, a quarter of which were from the DEA, less than a quarter from other 
federal agencies, and 55 percent from state and local police and sheriff departments. The 
latter have become increasingly important consumers of EPIC’s products and services in 
the last few years.
40
 The total number of requests for information (RFI) operated by the 
Center also increased “from 16,745 in 1975 to over 196,000 in fiscal year 1981.”41 In 
2011, the Center answered 333,000 RFI, supported 18,000 cases and produced 6,000 
reports.
42
 By comparison, from 1 August 2012 through 31 July 2013, the DHS-led 
National Network of Fusion Centers responded to 228,892 RFIs from agencies within 
fusion center areas of responsibility.
43
 Even though the methodologies to count these RFI 
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may vary, this comparison confirms that EPIC’s services are in relatively high-demand. 
According to the Department of Justice, “intelligence contributions, database queries, 
system users, and on-board staffing commitments from partner agencies” at EPIC all 
increased from 2001 to 2012.
44
 The apparent growth of EPIC presents the Center as a 
successful organization able to attract support, expand its scope of activities and its 
customer base. 
In recent years, support for EPIC was reinforced by at least two factors: the 
terrorist threat to the US and drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico. In the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks, the US government operated a rapprochement between the 
intelligence and law enforcement communities based on the nexus between crime and 
terrorism.
45
 This possibility led the US government to reintegrate the DEA’s Office of 
National Security Intelligence and its vast networks of informants within the intelligence 
community.
46
 From this perspective, drug activity could provide both the financial means 
and transit mechanism for terrorists and their weapons to reach the US homeland. The 
possibility that terrorists illegally cross the US-Mexico border led to a focus on 
counterterrorism along the border, which inevitably became tied to the long-standing 
issues of drug trafficking and illegal immigration. It is important to note that the crime-
terror nexus is not a theoretical construct created to attract more federal funding towards 
law enforcement agencies but a reality that ought to be considered seriously. In one 
notable case, a narcotics investigation on a Canadian organization that provided precursor 
chemicals to a Mexican drug ring, revealed the trafficking organization to be a Hezbollah 
support cell.
47
 
To support counterterrorism, law enforcement agencies have been encouraged to 
turn toward intelligence-led policing and develop an increasingly collaborative analytical 
environment in which all-source fusion is the norm.
48
 The mission of the DEA has thus 
expanded to support homeland security efforts, and EPIC, according to one of its former 
deputy directors, was turned into an “all-threat center.”49 Fusion centers, like EPIC, have 
provided the necessary structure to integrate and coordinate various agencies’ capabilities 
and fight the crime-terror nexus. They provide an ideal platform to harness connections 
between the federal, state, local, and tribal elements of the national security enterprise.
50
 
This capability is particularly useful in the struggle against terrorism, because terrorist 
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organizations, much like drug trafficking organizations, need to plan their activities to be 
successful, and when doing so they are likely to draw the attention of local authorities.  
According to the DEA, EPIC was called upon to support investigations to find 
those responsible for the 9/11 attacks because of its experience in supporting drug 
interdiction and investigations regarding criminal activities.
51
 The Center was also used 
to check the names of four suspects involved in the 2005 London subway bombings. 
EPIC’s information reportedly allowed investigators to draw a number of connections 
that helped identify more than a dozen individuals with international terrorist connections 
in the US.
52
 These stories suggest that EPIC can provide useful to support counterterrorist 
efforts. However, as long as EPIC belongs to the DEA, its efforts to counter terrorism are 
likely to remain secondary to its drug enforcement mission.  
The Center remains to this day a key component of the government 
counternarcotic strategies, which emphasize its role in the promotion of intelligence and 
information sharing.
53
 Support for law enforcement efforts along the Southwest border, 
including EPIC, was reinforced in the mid-2000s when cartel violence soared in Mexico 
and threatened to affect US interests and security along the border.
54
 The 2010 slayings at 
the US Consulate in Ciudad Juarez, a Mexican city that lies just south of El Paso, raised 
much concern and lead the government to augment law enforcement capabilities in El 
Paso and provide greater support to the Mexican security apparatus.  
Since EPIC is well aligned with federal strategies, the Center received significant 
financial support to expand its facilities and improve its information systems in the last 
few years.
55
 EPIC has clearly been successful at garnering support from key decision-
makers in the executive and legislative branches of government and this allowed the 
Center to grow. However, assessing EPIC’s performance requires a deeper examination 
of the Center’s inner working. 
 
Processes, services and products 
 
EPIC’s core mission has not changed much since its origins. According to the DOJ, the 
Center supports US “law enforcement and interdiction components through timely 
analysis and dissemination of intelligence on illicit drug and alien movements and the 
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criminal organizations responsible for these illegal activities.” 56  EPIC’s processes, 
services and products are designed to fulfill this mission. 
EPIC’s production process typically starts with a RFI that originates from outside 
of EPIC and is communicated by phone, email or through an online platform. The Center 
gives free access to millions of records, but direct access is limited to federal and state 
agencies primarily to limit the number of queries. This does not preclude sheriff offices 
and police departments’ to gain access to the information stored at EPIC; federal and 
state agencies can run queries on behalf of them, and exceptions are made when there is a 
special need, for example if an office is frequently involved in highway drug interdiction 
activity. All queries made to the Center are received, executed and responded by human 
operators; this system aims to provide better service to EPIC’s customers but it also 
hinders the volume of queries that can be dealt with.
57
  
The requests made to EPIC vary widely. Some of them simply require a database 
check on a vehicle plate number; others necessitate an assessment by subject matter 
experts. These requests are normally transmitted to the Joint Collection Management Unit 
(JCMU), which prioritizes requirements and dispatches them across the various units and 
teams composing the Center.
58
 In practice, requests are sometimes communicated directly 
to a specific subject matter expert manning one of EPIC’s units, without going through 
the JCMU. The employees receiving such direct requests need the approval of their 
supervisor to start working on them.  
One of the key tasks of EPIC is to provide real-time tactical support, helping law 
enforcement officers to track and target drug traffickers.
59
 The watch operations section, 
a one-stop shop that gives law enforcement and national security officials access to 
multiple confederated databases at one time, is an essential part of EPIC’s efforts at this 
level. This 24-hour, seven-days-a-week operations center responds to inquiries from 
government authorities regarding suspect individuals, vehicles, vessels, aircrafts, 
documents etc. The watch also sends lookouts for persons, vehicles, vessels, aircrafts and 
other alerts when requested by law enforcement agencies. Essentially, this section turns 
raw data into information and facilitates its dissemination to support law enforcement and 
interdiction in the field.
60
 The core mission of the watch is three-pronged: enabling 
officers to make better-informed judgments, protecting their safety, and increasing the 
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likelihood of their tactical success. Watch personnel rely on more than 70 federal, state 
and local databases to provide information in a timely manner (ideally under 30 minutes) 
to the requesters, usually law enforcement officers in tactical situations.
61
  
To ensure broader and more comprehensive access to its databases EPIC launched 
the open connectivity project in 2006. This portal provides users with web-based and 
direct access to EPIC data covering more than 35 years of activities related to drug-
trafficking and collected from state and local agencies. In recent years, EPIC has been 
able to provide a reply to a majority of the requests made to its federated database 
systems. From 2005 to 2014, 59 percent of the requests made to this system were 
matched by existing data in one of the databases queried by EPIC employees.
62
 An 
important resource available through this system is the National Seizure System (NSS), 
an EPIC database that tabulates information about drug seizures throughout the world 
with a particular focus on the US. In 2010, the DOJ Inspector General (IG) found that, as 
a result of the lack of standard procedure, the data contained in the NSS was inaccurate 
and incomplete.
63
 Five years later, EPIC finally hired technicians who started cleaning up 
this system to increase its reliability. This is important because the Center’s ability to 
match requests made to its databases is meaningless if the latter are unreliable. 
Assessing the Center’s performance at the tactical level is complicated because 
the Center does not systematically gather data on the use that is made of the information 
it provides to its customers. Outside of major cases leading to important arrests and 
seizures, EPIC staff receives very little feedback from law enforcement officers in the 
field. In practice, information provided by the Center may be useful to line officers in a 
variety of ways without directly leading to arrests and seizures, for example by informing 
an investigation. In other cases, inaccurate data entries can misinform law enforcement 
officers and lead to unwanted outcomes. In one case, the spouses were arrested shortly 
after landing their private plane, which had mistakenly been reported as stolen because of 
an error in an EPIC database. The ownership of the plane was eventually clarified and the 
two Americans were released.
64
 Similarly unreliable data could very well lead to suspect 
aircrafts not being controlled, and to the production of inaccurate reports. 
EPIC is more than a clearinghouse for other agencies’ information; it is actively 
involved in the production of intelligence. To respond to the requests they are tasked 
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with, EPIC’s experts have direct access to all the databases hosted by the Center, and can 
also use the information collected by their respective agency and EPIC.
65
 EPIC has a 
limited collection program that includes surveillance capabilities but, for the most part, it 
relies on participating agencies to collect raw intelligence from all types of sources 
including confidential informants, signal and geospatial intelligence.
66
 The Center 
produces a host of periodic reports as well as special publications. These include tactical 
reports on drug movement, operational assessments of drug trafficking organizations, and 
strategic assessments of drug-related currency movement, for example.
67
  
These core analytical functions and capabilities have not changed much over the 
last four decades, if anything they have expanded to adapt to the threat environment. 
EPIC’s staff now examines a broader array of threats including terrorism. Given the 
complexity of the threat environment in which it operates, and the vast amounts of 
information it processes, the Center has struggled to analyze all the information from the 
unique sources it possesses. This information overload is problematic to the extent that it 
has impacted on the quality of EPIC’s services and products, which are not always up to 
date.
68
 
EPIC’s multi-agency nature and its ability to process and analyze all-source 
intelligence from a variety of agencies – in a way a single agency could not – add value 
to its services and products. However, this multi-agency setting also complicates the 
production of intelligence. Once an analyst has drafted a report, it is sent for peer-review 
to his or her colleagues working within the same unit, and will then need to be approved 
by EPIC’s hierarchy before it can be disseminated to external consumers (see figure 1). 
This review process involves the analyst’s immediate superior, typically a chief of unit, 
his or her section chief, then all the section chiefs, the production unit (reviewing 
language and form), and the executive office (composed of senior officials representing 
each of the agencies contributing to the Center, the general counsel, the chief of staff, and 
the director of the Center). At each level, the draft report can be sent back to the analyst 
for review and will then need to be re-submitted (see dotted arrows and feedback loop in 
figure 1).  
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Figure 1 – EPIC’s Analytical Review Process 
 
Disagreements on the content of analytical reports often occur at the level of the 
executive office, where senior officials typically stand for their respective agency’s 
interest, and disregard each other’s comments. On the whole, this review process is 
essential to the making of multi-agency intelligence products, but it slows the production 
of reports and can significantly decrease their timeliness. This is problematic to the extent 
that one of EPIC’s missions is to provide timely analysis on emerging and current issues 
and threats to its customers. Depending on the type of product, EPIC’s intelligence is 
disseminated to specific consumers or sent out to vast networks of government 
employees through distribution lists.  
In 2010, a survey of EPIC’s customers conducted by the DOJ IG found that a vast 
majority of them reported high satisfaction with the Center’s services and products. 
According to the study, “most federal, state, and local personnel who responded stated 
that they viewed EPIC products and services as fully meeting their criteria for timeliness 
(76 percent), accuracy (82 percent), relevance (80 percent), and immediate usability (74 
percent).”69 Nevertheless, the IG report criticized EPIC for lacking a strategy to publicize 
and promote its products, and not systematically seeking feedback from its customers.
70
 
Five years later (in early 2015), EPIC finally started to include feedback sheets to its 
intelligence reports. At this stage, it is not clear how the Center’s leadership will make 
use of this new and important resource, and how analysts will benefit from it. 
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Enablers 
 
The processing of information and the production of intelligence at EPIC is made 
possible thanks to a series of supporting factors including governance, information 
technology systems and human resources. Patrick Walsh emphasizes the key role these 
factors play in effective intelligence frameworks, and in particular the importance of a 
sound governance structure that creates the conditions for effective actions.
71
 In the 
present case, to be sound, EPIC’s governance structure should set the conditions for the 
effective coordination of drug enforcement resources along the Southwest border. 
The Center’s governance structure reflects its-multi-agency nature. EPIC is a 
component of the DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence, which aims to 
facilitate intelligence coordination and information sharing between the DEA, the IC and 
the broader US security apparatus. EPIC’s director, a DEA senior executive, is supported 
by a deputy director and four associate deputy directors (ADDs) who represent some of 
the principal members of EPIC like DHS and the FBI. ADDs and senior representatives 
of each of the main agencies participating to the Center (called program coordinators) 
form the executive office. Below the executive office, the Center is currently divided into 
four sections (support, tactical, operational, strategic), each of which is headed by an 
ADD. Each section contains number of units and teams, which are typically staffed by 
subject matter experts from different agencies. This governance structure and the 
procedures followed to reach multi-agency decisions are defined by EPIC’s charter, a 
document that has been rewritten half a dozen times since EPIC’s establishment. 
 Interagency coordination is the most important governance challenge faced by 
EPIC because it directly impacts on the Center’s ability to fuse multiple agencies’ 
resources and capabilities to serve its customers. Coordination issues are common in the 
US security apparatus, particularly in multi-agency centers where the law enforcement, 
intelligence and military communities interact on a daily basis. Differences in 
organizational culture, procedures, objectives, resources and logistics, all complicate the 
coordination of various agencies’ efforts, even when the latter share similar missions. 
According to Robert Taylor and Amanda Russell, fusion is particularly challenging for 
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law enforcement agencies because they possess a number of traits including their 
autonomy, organizational ego, and a desire to keep control over their information that 
“hinder the effective and efficient sharing of information and intelligence.”72 Yet these 
same differences provide for a rich environment in which multiple perspectives are 
represented within a single organization. Exploiting this diversity is the raison d’être of 
intelligence centers. Even though it is unlikely that a center ever achieves a perfect 
interagency process, where resources and capabilities would be fused seamlessly, 
progress towards this ideal is possible. 
The efforts to stir the interagency process at EPIC started slowly and have proved 
challenging ever since. Evidence of tensions emerged in the media as early as 1975 when 
the Los Angeles Times reported a “feud” between the DEA and the Customs Services 
over the amount of marijuana being smuggled from Mexico and the Caribbean to the US 
through the air.
73
 The same year, a government report found that federal drug law 
enforcement efforts continued to suffer from “problems of fragmented organization and 
resulting interagency conflicts” between the DEA, Customs and the FBI. 74  The 
intersection of responsibilities for drug law enforcement was not fundamentally altered 
by the presidential reorganization plan that established the DEA in 1973. Despite some 
early successes in the form of arrests, interagency conflicts subsisted, including 
jurisdictional disputes revolving around the distinction between interdiction and 
investigation, and the different methods of operation used by the three federal agencies at 
EPIC. To force effective interagency cooperation the General Accounting Office 
recommended “a clear directive on the part of someone acting on the President’s behalf 
to compel agencies to comply.”75 This advice, that of an outsider organization, remained 
unheeded. The interagency process continued to pose problems less than a decade later, 
when another Government Accounting Office report found that, as a result of persisting 
bureaucratic wrangling, EPIC was “not being fully supported by participating agencies” 
and this situation impacted negatively on several interdiction projects.
76
  
This problem has not completely disappeared, if anything, EPIC’s growth and the 
participation of new agencies has further complicated interagency coordination. The 
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 effectively brought 
together a host of organizations involved in the Center under a single leadership and 
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affected the delicate inter-institutional balance within EPIC. The global war on terrorism 
also strengthened the role of Department of Defense components working on homeland 
defense and lead to a greater involvement of military personnel with EPIC.
77
 One of the 
key issues encountered at this level is the different methods and approaches to 
intelligence followed by law enforcement professional working in drug interdiction and 
other military and intelligence professionals working on counterterrorism and homeland 
defense.
78
 For instance, the intelligence and defense communities tend to use higher 
classification standards than their law enforcement counterpart and this can complicate 
the sharing of information.
79
 A 2010 DOJ report found that EPIC was not effectively 
resolving coordination issues “such as ensuring that priorities are agreed upon so that 
programs are sustained and that member agencies meet expectations for participation and 
information sharing.”80 The recent adoption of a new charter (in 2015) may improve this 
situation. 
The multiplicity of organizations involved in drug interdiction also complicates 
coordination between EPIC and outside organizations. In the 1990s, EPIC and other 
government agencies involved in countering narco-trafficking reportedly remained 
deeply divided.
81
 More recently, EPIC’s coordination with federal and state intelligence 
organizations across the country, in particular with key intelligence centers, has been 
found to be inconsistent.
82
 The multiplication of fusion centers in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks has added a layer of organizations and further complicated inter-institutional 
coordination.
83
 
In addition to problems of coordination, EPIC has faced issues of functional 
overlap.
84
 In 2004, a top-down review of DEA intelligence included a survey in which 87 
percent of the respondents considered that the roles and missions of EPIC and other 
similar organizations overlapped or were redundant to some degree. The study notes that 
this is an issue of “perception,” yet it also identifies overlaps between EPIC and a variety 
of local and regional centers, tasks forces and field divisions involved in drug 
interdiction.
85
 A recent DOJ report confirms the trend and remarks that “there is an 
increased likelihood for duplication of effort.”86 Within El Paso, and at the state and 
national levels, EPIC is only but one of a host of fusion centers.
87
 
 17 
The plethora of multi-agency centers involved in drug enforcement raises 
important questions about the efficiency of the government’s efforts in this domain. 
However, the inevitable overlap between these center’s missions and activities is not 
necessarily a waste of resources; decision-makers at various levels of government require 
tailored products and services on similar issues. The negative effects of these overlaps 
can also be minimized through careful coordination. Even though EPIC does not have the 
authority to impose its priorities to other centers and agencies, it can make its voice 
heard. From this perspective, the various entities involved in drug interdiction and law 
enforcement along the Southwest border should continue to meet and coordinate their 
actions at multiple levels through working groups.
88
 At higher levels, decision-makers 
need periodic surveys of the drug enforcement efforts along the border to keep an eye the 
need for reorganization. 
Beyond governance issues, interagency coordination rests on technical solutions. 
Agencies collect information in different ways and common systems need to be set up to 
overcome these differences and communicate effectively. This technical challenge was 
confronted at EPIC thanks to the development of programs which store, retrieve, 
correlate intelligence and provide “opportunities for different investigators to “get 
together” on a case despite geographic distance.”89  A central aspect of the technical 
solutions provided by EPIC has been the development of a deconfliction mechanism “that 
notifies the appropriate parties when common links are identified among investigations.” 
This process started informally, with EPIC putting officers in contact when it received a 
request and knew that other customers had made a similar request.
 90
  
Today, deconfliciton is computerized and all the queries to the Center are kept in 
a database that allows EPIC to put requesters in contact with each other. This process 
prevents overlaps between interdiction, that is to say seizures and arrests, and ongoing 
investigations. The database can also be used to point to specific directions where more 
information might be, for example it may point a federal agent towards specific non-
federal databases. At this level, technology clearly enables EPIC to better serve its 
customers. The 2016 DOJ congressional submission, in which the department requests 
for further funding to update EPIC’s information technology systems, confirms that the 
Center’s leadership is well aware of the continuing importance of this key enabler. 
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Considering the human dimension, another enabler highlighted by Walsh, 
frequent interactions between EPIC employees from various government agencies have 
ensured cooperation through informal means. Acquaintances working on the same floor 
or within the same unit often prove useful to break the stovepipes that hinder the sharing 
and dissemination of information and intelligence products across the US law 
enforcement and intelligence communities. At the individual level, interagency relations 
are furthered by regular working meetings and the use of peer review within many units. 
From this perspective the existence of the Center fosters a culture of cooperation that is 
beneficial to drug enforcement and broader national security efforts.  
While EPIC employees work together, for the most part, they do not receive 
common, interagency, training. Each participating agency provides its own initial 
training, and sometimes opportunities for continuing professional development, to its 
employees. In some cases, an agency providing training for its employees may extend an 
invitation to members of other agencies working at the Center, but EPIC does not provide 
its own training. Some employees simply learn on the job the specific tasks they will 
conduct for the Center. This is the case of those employees working at the watch, who 
have to be able to make efficient use of the dozens of databases available at EPIC. More 
controversially, in the time of crisis that followed the 9/11 attacks, administrative 
assistant and secretary positions were converted into intelligence analysts positions to fill 
workforce gaps, without providing these clerks with any analytical training. This 
situation, even though it may have been exceptional, could have been resolved thanks to 
the provision of analytic training by the Center. Providing systematic and joint training to 
EPIC employees across all levels could provide EPIC with a further opportunity to adapt 
its workforce and nurture an interagency culture. 
 
Outcomes and outputs 
 
EPIC’s activities are generally well aligned with the security objectives set by the US 
government in the domain of drug enforcement. US security strategies emphasize the 
need to coordinate various government agencies’ efforts to combat organized crime and 
disrupt domestic drug trafficking and production.
91
 The mere existence of a multi-
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jurisdictional intelligence center facilitating access to multiple agencies’ resources and 
capabilities should contribute to this objective. Drug control strategies often determine 
specific indicators to measure the progress made towards the objectives they set. In the 
realm of drug interdiction, these indicators typically refer to outputs like the number of 
organizations disrupted or dismantled, and the amount of drug seizures. Since EPIC’s 
role is not to arrest criminals and seize drugs, but to provide support to those who do so, 
other indicators are needed. For example, the National Drug Control Strategy refers to an 
increase in the number of databases an organization gives access to, as an indicator of its 
contribution towards information sharing. This is problematic since the mere existence of 
an accessible database does not say anything about its applications and overall 
usefulness.  
The National Drug Control Strategy also uses increases in the timeliness of 
selected federal datasets, and the number of datasets that establish feedback, to measure 
improvement in information systems.
92
 EPIC’s recent efforts to make the NSS database 
more reliable, gain and give access to new databases (e.g. those of the High Intensity 
Drug Trafficking Area network), and ask for feedback on its analytical reports, suggest 
that the Center is actively trying to fulfil these objectives. However, feedback is not 
systematically sought, especially when RFI concern information (as opposed to 
intelligence).  
The latest DOJ congressional submission puts a similar emphasis on metrics and 
details the number of RFI EPIC was able to reply to and the related use of EPIC’s 
federated databases system on a yearly basis.
93
 EPIC’s management review system also 
seems to be, at least partly, based on numbers. Chiefs of unit expect their supervisees to 
successfully reply to a certain number of RFI every day, week and month. EPIC 
employees thus fill out spreadsheets in which they report their various activities, track the 
RFI they have answered and the number of active investigations they have supported. 
However, relying on quantifiable outputs does not always account for the quality and the 
amount of work devoted to answer a request. One of the issues at this level is that EPIC’s 
basic reporting system does not differentiate between requests focusing on a specific 
piece of information, and those that require an in-depth assessment.  
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Reporting based on strictly quantitative measures provides for an incomplete 
review of the Center’s performance. Such measures focus on specific outputs to the 
detriment of less quantifiable outcomes like the enduring sense of community and 
informal networks that develop when people work together and its impact on EPIC’s 
ability to fuse resources and capabilities. Likewise, quantitative measures are ill-suited to 
assess the quality and relevance of the Center’s services and products.94  The recent 
addition of feedback forms to EPIC’s intelligence reports provides an opportunity to 
assess the Center’s performance in a more qualitative way. EPIC’s main function is to 
support drug enforcement efforts, and its customers are ideally placed to assess the 
Center’s ability to inform their decisions. 
Occasional reviews of EPIC by external entities have historically provided well-
rounded appraisals of the Center’s activities. The latest review by the DOJ IG has 
apparently encouraged EPIC to improve some of its core processes, for example by 
seeking customer’s feedback more systematically. However, the Center’s leadership 
should not wait for such reviews to seek improvements. EPIC’s performance needs to be 
considered systematically and comprehensively, thanks to the use of quantitative as well 
as qualitative methods. EPIC’s efforts to disseminate information to law enforcement 
officers still lacks a well-established feedback loop that could more consistently inform 
the center’s efforts at the tactical level. The Center also needs to clearly distinguish 
between information and intelligence when assessing its own performance. While the 
former is generally disseminated in a timely manner, the time-consuming process through 
which intelligence is produced at EPIC impedes upon the timeliness of its reports. 
Overall, more comprehensive assessments of the Center’s performance will provide a 
more solid basis to improve its services and products, and adapt to the needs of its 
customers and employees. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The El Paso Intelligence Center underwent a tremendous expansion over the last four 
decades and this alone is a testimony to its ability to promote its organizational interests. 
A growing number of agencies have joined and continue to support EPIC, finding a 
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common interest in sharing their resources and capabilities. RFI sent to EPIC have 
generally increased too, which suggests there is a clear demand for EPIC’s services and 
products. EPIC has generated a series of tactical successes in the realm of drug 
enforcement and even proved its value in counterterrorist efforts, a feat that most DHS 
fusion centers are at pain to achieve.
95
  
The Center provides metrics and emphasizes success stories to demonstrate its 
contribution to the US government interdiction efforts. However, more comprehensive 
and systematic review mechanisms have the potential to better inform EPIC’s leadership 
about the Center’s performance. Once these foundations are established, leadership will 
be crucial to ensure the Center continues to prove its relevance amid a growing number 
of similar organizations in the region and beyond. EPIC has demonstrated an ability to 
change to improve its processes. This ability to change and, more importantly, the 
Center’s ability to adapt on its own initiative, are essential to its future performance.96 
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